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Signed into law by President Clinton in 1994,
the Communications Assistance for Law Enforce-
ment Act' ("CALEA" or the "Act") was intended
to better define the duties of telecommunications
carriers in assisting law enforcement in adminis-
tering authorized wiretaps. The Act provided for
industry establishment of technical standards out-
lining specifications that bring various technolo-
gies and services into compliance with CALEA's
assistance capability requirements. 2 Following
years of industry deliberation over the standards,
which were accompanied by protests from law en-
forcement agencies and privacy advocates, the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or
the "Commission") issued a report and order
adopting the proposed industry standards along
with several additional features requested by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). 3 The
propriety of the Third Report and Order and the
standards contained within it, are now the subject
of consolidated petitions for review pending in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit.4 Federal wiretap law is thus
experiencing new Fourth Amendment challenges,
in addition to other growing pains accompanying
CALEA implementation, as it expands to cover
more recent telecommunications technologies
and services.
This comment begins with an overview of the
history of federal wiretap law. Then, after an in-
' Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 and various sections of 18
U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).
2 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(l), at 18 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3498 (noting the driving forces behind
CALEA); 47 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1006 (1999) (setting forth assis-
tance capability requirements for telecommunications carri-
ers and the safe harbor provision triggered when carriers
comply with standards adopted by the industry as a whole,
respectively).
troduction to CALEA and its structure, the paper
discusses and analyzes the FCC's 'Third Report and
Order containing the technical standards for assis-
tance capability. Finally, the author advances a se-
ries of arguments in favor of upholding the Third
Report and Order. These arguments are designed to
address both the economic concerns of telecom-
munications industry participants and the poten-
tial implications for individual privacy. This com-
ment casts the disputed technical standards as
precisely what Congress intended when it enacted
CALEA: specifications designed to preserve the
ability of law enforcement to carry out authorized
wiretaps in the face of increasingly complex tele-
communications technology. The innovative con-
cept of establishing industry standards to achieve
such a purpose will be defended by emphasizing
its implementation of forward-looking design
specifications that, in practice, should perpetuate
the peaceful coexistence and continuing harmo-
nization of individual electronic privacy and le-
gally authorized surveillance technology.
I. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States of America guarantees:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no war-
3 See In Re Communications Assistance for Law Enforce-
ment Act, Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 16794 (1999)
[hereinafter Third Report and Order].
4 See Brief of Petitioners United States Telecom Associa-
tion ("USTA") Cellular Telecommunications Industry Associ-
ation ("CTIA"), and Center for Democracy and Technology
("CDT"), at 8, United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC (D.C. Cir.
2000) (Nos. 99-1442, 99-1466, 99-1475, 99-1523) [hereinafter
USTA Brie].
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rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. 5
A likelihood of criminal activity has long been
held to satisfy the "probable cause" requirement
contained in the Fourth Amendment, 6 and law
enforcement agencies would be severely ham-
pered in their crime-fighting efforts were it not
for such leeway. 7 Before the twentieth century,
American courts of law observed the common law
rule that "if the tendered evidence was pertinent,
the method of obtaining it was unimportant."8 In
1914, however, the Supreme Court limited the
practice of unchecked evidence gathering in
Weeks v. United States by adopting what has be-
come known as the exclusionary rule. The rule
states that no evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment may be used in court."'
Wiretapping was not considered a search and
seizure within the scope of the Fourth Amend-
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(b), (3)(a) (1999) (requiring,
in a wiretap application order, facts tending to show that an
offense is being, has been or is about to be committed; such
an order will be issued only if a judge determines that the
facts establish probable cause that the offense is being, has
been or is about to be committed).
7 According to the House Judiciary Committee: "[l]aw
enforcement officials have consistently testified . . . that
court-authorized electronic surveillance is a critical law en-
forcement and public safety tool." H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(1),
at 12 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
8 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462-63
(1928).
9 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
'0 See id. at 391-92.
I I See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465-66 (noting that by 1928,
fifty years had passed since the invention of the telephone,
and holding that unauthorized wiretaps installed and moni-
tored without entering the petitioners' homes or office were
neither searches nor seizures within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment). But see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967) (invoking the Fourth Amendment to invalidate a New
York statute allowing the use of electronic eavesdropping in
criminal investigations by law enforcement officers); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (concluding that
"[t]he Government's activities in electronically listening to
and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone
booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment"). Federal prohibition
officers in Olmstead gathered evidence of a conspiracy to im-
port and distribute "intoxicating liquors" in violation of the
National Prohibition Act by inserting wires along telephone
lines leading from petitioners' homes and their "chief of-
fice," and transcribing incriminating conversations over-
heard by the officers. See Olmstead, 227 U.S at 456-57.
12 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53 (citing Olnstead, 277 U.S.
at 457, 464-66 (noting various authorities that tend to sup-
ment for the first ninety years after the invention
of the telephone."I The fundamental hurdle for
evidentiary challenges during that time was the
long-held contention that the Fourth Amend-
ment only protected tangible property.'2 Further-
more, the constitutionality of wiretapping was ren-
dered moot (at least temporarily) by Section
6051 1 of the Communications Act of 193414
("Communications Act" or "1934 Act"). This pro-
vision made it a federal crime to intercept, dis-
close or publish the contents of wiretaps unautho-
rized by the sender of telephone and telegraph
communications.' 5 Even federal law enforcement
agents were held within the coverage of this provi-
sion in Nardone v. United States.' 6 Yet the prohibi-
tion did not then effectively extend to state law
enforcement or the use of wiretap evidence in
state courts. 17
The landmark Berger and Katz cases, both de-
cided in 1967, definitively changed the landscape
port a real and personal property-oriented reading of
"searches and seizures" and urging construction of the Con-
stitution in light of its literal meaning at the time of its adop-
tion)).
'3 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1999).
14 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-714).
15 See 47 U.S.C. § 605. The statute then read, in pertinent
part, "'no person not being authorized by the sender shall
intercept any communication and divulge or publish the ex-
istence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
such intercepted communication to any person.'" Nardone
v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 381 (1937) (quoting § 605 of
the Communications Act).
16 There were two cases bearing this title and both are
relevant here. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379
(1937); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). Both
of the Nardone cases dealt with the same criminal trial in
which federal agents used evidence from wiretaps to gain
convictions under the National Prohibition Act. The issue ad-
dressed in the first Supreme Court opinion was whether, in
view of section 605, evidence gathered in this way was admis-
sible in a federal criminal trial. After determining that pro-
curing such evidence by federal agents was illegal, thus ren-
dering the evidence inadmissible, the case was remanded to
the district court. Soon afterward, in the context of another
subsequent appeal, the Second Circuit recast the issue to en-
compass "every other use of the proscribed evidence." Nar-
done, 308 U.S. at 339. In its second opinion, the Supreme
Court responded by stating that a trial judge must allow "the
accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against
him was a fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. at 341. The Court
also placed upon the government the defensive burden of
demonstrating the independent origin of any allegedly
tainted evidence. See id.
17 The Supreme Court noted in Berger that, by 1967,
some states permitted their law enforcement officials to use
wiretaps under certain conditions defined by statute or in the
state constitution. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 48-49 n.4-5.
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of wiretap law in the United States. Both opinions
brought electronic eavesdropping 8 within the
definition of a Fourth Amendment search and
seizure. 19 These decisions overturned criminal
convictions based on evidence gathered by the il-
legal use of electronic eavesdropping. 20 In both
cases the Court based its decision on the Fourth
Amendment, probably because Section 605 of the
Communications Act was then limited to tele-
phone and telegraph communications.2 ' By thus
incorporating electronic eavesdropping into the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court effec-
tively updated the law to reflect the new techno-
logical reality.22
Berger and Katz, however, were more than just
"right to privacy" cases. 23 The Berger Court invali-
dated a New York statute allowing the issue of war-
rants for "eavesdropping" because the statutory
standards for obtaining a warrant did not meet
the explicit constitutional requirement of "partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized." 24 The statute
did not require law enforcement to describe the
sought conversations with particularity. It allowed
eavesdropping to continue for two months under
a single warrant and provided a simple renewal
18 "Eavesdropping" is treated as including any method
used to overhear private conversations. See id. at 51-53. Wire-
tapping implicitly falls within that definition. See id. at 46. Yet
a survey of state laws in 1967 revealed inconsistent statutory
treatment of wiretaps and electronic eavesdropping devices.
See id. at 47-49.
19 See id. at 51 (holding that "the use of electronic devices
to capture [a conversation is] a 'search' within the meaning
of the [Fourth] Amendment"); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (finding
that the government, in listening to and recording peti-
tioner's telephone conversations, had conducted a Fourth
Amendment "search and seizure").
20 See Berger, 388 U.S. at 44-45; Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-49.
21 See Berger, 388 U.S. at 64; Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
22 "The law, though jealous of individual privacy, has not
kept pace with these advances in scientific knowledge." Ber-
ger, 388 U.S. at 49.
23 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment
cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to
privacy' . . . its protections go further, and often have noth-
ing to do with privacy at all.").
24 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 58-60
(discussing the various shortcomings of the statute).
25 See Berger, 388 U.S. at 58-60.
26 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 354-59 (reviewing "'the proce-
dure of antecedent justification ... that is central to the
Fourth Amendment"' (quoting Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 323, 330 (1966))).
27 See Berger, 388 U.S. at 60-62. Appended to Justice
White's lengthy dissent in Berger was an excerpt from a 1967
report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice, entitled "The Challenge of
procedure. It did not require termination of sur-
veillance upon seizure of the desired conversa-
tion, and it did not require a showing of "exigent
circumstances" to overcome the lack of notice in-
herent in eavesdropping. 25 While Katz did not ad-
dress a state eavesdropping statute, that opinion
also focused on the proper procedure for ob-
taining a warrant and carrying out authorized sur-
veillance. 26 Both decisions addressed law enforce-
ment concerns regarding the difficulty of
investigating organized crime without wiretaps or
electronic eavesdropping techniques.27 As Justice
White noted in his Berger dissent, anyone putting a
finger to the wind in 1967 should have noticed
that such law enforcement concerns had gained
enough legitimacy in Congress to inspire federal
legislation capable of undermining the strict re-
quirements for legal electronic surveillance estab-
lished by the Berger majority.28
The contemplated federal eavesdropping legis-
lation was ultimately enacted as Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
196829 ("1968 Act"). Title III contained the wire-
tap provisions that remain the core of federal
wiretap law today. 30 While upholding the existing
federal ban on wiretapping and expanding it to
Crime in a Free Society," which classified wiretapping and
eavesdropping as indispensable to fighting organized crime.
See id. app. at 119-29 (White,J, dissenting).Justice White felt
that the electronic surveillance at issue in Bergerwas reasona-
ble under the circumstances and that the Court had improp-
erly used the case as a vehicle for resolving the many issues
raised by official wiretapping and eavesdropping. See id. at
118 (White, J., dissenting). Although no direct mention of
the challenge of investigating organized crime without elec-
tronic surveillance was made in Katz, it can be inferred that
the FBI investigation at issue concerned organized crime.
The facts of the case centered on a conviction for participa-
tion in a bookmaking conspiracy, after which the petitioner
was compelled to testify under a grant of immunity before a
federal grand jury concerning the charges involved. See Katz,
389 U.S. at 349 n.3. It also appears that the agents in Katz
believed that they were carrying out their investigation in an
entirely legal fashion. See id. at 352, 356 (characterizing the
agents as deliberately abstaining from penetrating the con-
fines of the telephone booth, in reliance on Olmstead).
28 See Berger, 388 U.S. at 112-18 (noting the numerous
bills then before Congress, as well as House and Senate com-
mittee hearings contemplating federal wiretap and eaves-
dropping legislation).
29 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. II, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (1999)).
3) See In Re Communications Assistance for Law Enforce-
ment Act, Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, Joint Petition for Expedited Rulemaking, CC Dkt. No.
97-213 at 6 (filed Mar. 27, 1998) [hereinafter DOJ/FBI Peti-
tion]. Indeed, the federal wiretap statute is still commonly
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include other forms of electronic eavesdrop-
ping,31 the 1968 Act laid out a uniform procedure
under which electronic eavesdropping would be
authorized and conducted legally by law enforce-
ment.32 A court order could be issued allowing
the interception of the contents of wire or oral
communications upon a showing of probable
cause that a crime has been, is being or will be
committed, and that "particular communications"
regarding the crime will thereby be acquired.33
The application for the order had to show that
ordinary investigative procedures had failed,
would probably not succeed or would involve too
much danger. 34 Only those crimes listed at Sec-
tion 2516 could be investigated in this manner.3 5
Each order had to limit the interception period to
the shortest time necessary for seizure of the de-
sired communication defined in the order. 36 Fur-
thermore, the order had to include a clause di-
recting that the interception of communications
not authorized for seizure would be minimized.3 7
This "minimization" requirement in Title III
has since been alleged to satisfy the "particularity"
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.3 8 At a
minimum, the required showing that normal in-
vestigative means are insufficient for a given fac-
tual scenario is reminiscent of the "exigent cir-
cumstances" required by the Berger Court to
overcome a lack of prior notice.3 9 Still, the 1968
Act contained requirements that notice of the in-
vestigation had to be provided following the ter-
mination of the interception period.41 In addi-
tion, prior to any trial in which the contents of
known as "Title Il."
31 The 1968 Act explicitly covered both wire and oral
communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1968). "Con-
gress therein defined oral communication" as "any oral com-
munication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation
that such communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying such expectation." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(2) (1968).
-2 The Senate Report noted the twin purposes of the
1968 Act: to protect communications privacy and to "de-
lineat[e] on a uniform basis the circumstances and condi-
tions under which the interception of wire and oral commu-
nications may be authorized." S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 66
(1968).
33 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1999).
34 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (a), (c).
35 See id. at § 2518(3) (a), (c). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2516
(1999) (containing the exclusive list of suspected criminal ac-
tivity-mostly felonies-for the investigation of which a wire-
tap may be authorized).
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
-17 See id. at § 2518(5).
38 See, e.g., James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in
intercepted communications would be intro-
duced as evidence, copies of the application and
authorizing court order were to be provided to
each party.41 The party against whom the evi-
dence was offered could move to suppress it on
the basis of illegal interception, the insufficiency
of the authorizing order or the failure of the in-
vestigating officers to conduct their surveillance
in a manner consistent with the scope of the or-
der.4 2
One necessary provision not included in, the
1968 legislation was a means for law enforcement
to compel the cooperation of telephone carriers
that were reluctant or unwilling to lend the neces-
sary technical support for a court-ordered wire-
tap. 43 This potential oversight was brought to
Congress' attention in 1970 by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.44 Shortly
thereafter, Congress added a provision to the stat-
ute requiring telephone carriers to provide "all in-
formation, facilities, and technical assistance nec-
essary to accomplish the interception"
authorized. 45
Telecommunications technology advanced sig-
nificantly over the next fifteen years. In an at-
tempt to keep pace with the proliferation of new
services and technologies, Congress responded
with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 198646 ("1986 Act"). This legislation expanded
existing federal wiretap authority to other
nonvoice "electronic communications" not gener-
ally accessible to the public.4 7 Also included was a
new Chapter 121 in Title 18 of the United States
the Digital Age: Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance
Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 65, 72 (1997).
39 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. See also S.
Rep. No. 90-1097, at 66.
40 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d).
41 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9).
42 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (a).
43 See In Re Communications Assistance for Law Enforce-
ment Act, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd. 3149,
para. 3 (1997).
44 See Application of the United States, 427 F.2d 639,
643-44 (9th Cir. 1970).
45 Pub. L. No. 91-358, tit. II, § 211 (b), 84 Stat. 654 (1970)
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)).
46 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (amending
various sections of 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1986 Act]. See S.
Rep. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3556 (adopting Senator Leahy's assessment that existing fed-
eral wiretap law was "hopelessly out of date").
47 Under the 1986 Act, "electronic communications" is
defined as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelec-
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Code, devoted entirely to "Stored Wire and Elec-
tronic Communications and Transactional
Records Access."48 Additionally, Congress decided
to enact a new uniform federal procedure gov-
erning the authorization and use of pen registers
and trap-and-trace devices. 49 The use of these de-
vices is not governed by the Fourth Amendment,
and they had been held to be outside the scope of
the 1968 Act because of their inability to intercept
the contents of communications. 50 The 1986 Act
generally prohibited their use, making exceptions
for court-authorized law enforcement actions-a
design similar to the existing uniform scheme cov-
ering wiretaps. 51 In addition to individual privacy
concerns, Congress' chief objective in enacting
the 1986 Act was to eliminate the "[t]he lack of
clear [legal] standards [governing the privacy of
nonvoice communications that] may expose law
enforcement officers to liability and ... endanger
the admissibility of evidence."52
II. THE COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT
("CALEA") 53
Recognizing the continued explosion of new
telecommunications technology since 1986,' 4
Congress responded to the widening gap between
legal standards and technological facts by enact-
ing CALEA. 55 In so doing, Congress also achieved
a new paradigm in wiretap and communications
privacy legislation.5 6 Where the 1986 Act had
merely echoed the existing requirement that a
telecommunications carrier must provide any "as-
sistance necessary to accomplish the intercep-
tion,"' 57 CALEA oudines the specific responsibili-
ties of a telecommunications carrier when
confronted by an interception order. 58 The ensu-
ing battle over appropriate technical standards
for industry-wide implementation of the assis-
tance capability requirements set forth in Section
tronic or photooptical system that affects interstate com-
merce or foreign commerce." 1986 Act, supra note 46, at
§ 101 (a) (6) (C) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(12) (1999)). Excluded from coverage is any intercep-
tion of electronic communication carried by a "system that is
configured so that such.., communication is readily accessi-
ble to the general public." Id. at § 101(b)(4) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (1999)).
48 Id. at § 201 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-710 (1999)).
49 See id. at § 301 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3121-27 (1999)). A "pen register" is a device used to re-
cord or decode numbers dialed on a telephone by deriving
the outgoing digits from the signals carried over the attached
telephone line (other than any such device used by a tele-
phone carrier for billing purposes). See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)
(1999). Similarly, a "[trap-and-trace] device" captures that
portion of a telephone signal that identifies the number of
the telephone from which an incoming call originated. See id.
at § 3127(4).
50 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (hold-
ing telephone numbers not protected by Fourth Amend-
ment); United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159,
166-67 (1977) (finding that because pen registers do not
capture the contents of communications they do not "inter-
cept" communications as contemplated by the 1968 Act).
51 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121, 3123. One notable difference
between the wiretap and pen register statutes is that there is
no exclusive list of crimes for which a pen register order may
be issued. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (listing all crimes that may be
subject to investigation by an authorized wiretap).
52 S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3559.
55 Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 and various sections of 18
U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).
54 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(I), at 2 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3492 (discussing the accelerating
"pace of change in technology and in the structure of the
telecommunications industry").
55 See id. (discussing the legal challenges to law enforce-
ment and privacy concerns presented by digital telephony
and the proliferation of wireless telecommunication services
and online transactions).
56 The Act requires the design of all new telecommunica-
tions systems to include standard capabilities that, pursuant
to a court order, can enable law enforcement officers to carry
out authorized electronic surveillance with maximum admin-
istrative efficiency and minimal cost to the telecommunica-
tions carrier. See generally id. at 13-20 (developing the idea of
this built-in surveillance capability as a unified solution to the
tripartite problem of defining the limitations of a telecom-
munications carrier's duty to assist law enforcement in carry-
ing out a wiretap order, the technical and political challenges
of access faced by law enforcement, and industry concerns
regarding the potential effects of wiretap order compliance
on competition and innovation).
57 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (concerning wiretaps and elec-
tronic eavesdropping). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3124(a), (b) (ap-
plying substantially the same language to pen registers and
trap-and-trace devices); United States v. New York Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. 159, 176-177 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)).
58 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(I), at 16-17 (1994), reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3496 (discussing law enforcement assis-
tance capabilities to be required of telecommunications car-
riers by CALEA). See also 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (1999) (codifying
the discussed assistance capability requirements).
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103 of CALEA 59 has since raised the question of
whether the Congressional mandate was specific
enough.
61
A. Responsibilities of Telecommunications
Carriers
For purposes of CALEA, the definition of a tele-
communications carrier includes any person or
entity that transmits or switches wire or electronic
interstate or foreign communications as a "com-
mon carrier for hire."'6 1 Congress explicitly in-
tended this definition to include cellular carriers,
personal communications service ("PCS") provid-
ers, cable operators, and satellite-based service
providers, as well as local exchange carriers, inter-
exchange carriers and competitive access provid-
ers. 62 In addition, the FCC has the authority to
designate future providers of yet-to-be-developed
local telephone exchange technologies and ser-
vices as "telecommunications carriers" subject to
CALEA.63 Yet information service providers are
specifically excluded from the statutory defini-
tion.6 4
CALEA requires that telecommunications carri-
ers provide authorized law enforcement officers
access to communications contents and identify-
ing information expeditiously, unobtrusively and
59 47 U.S.C. § 1002.
60 In response to telecommunications industry reluc-
tance to comply voluntarily with CALEA's technical man-
dates, and responding to the Department ofJustice and FBI
requests for assistance, the FCC began a series of rulemaking
proceedings under 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b). These FCC actions
will be discussed in later sections of this paper.
61 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (8) (A) (1999). The discussion in the
subsequent text employs the definition of a "common car-
rier" of wire and radio communications as found in 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(10) (1999). A more basic definition of common carrier
is one who, in providing a service, "holds himself out to serve
indifferently all potential users." Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory
Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
62 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(I), at 20 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3500 (listing various telecommunications
services that the definition was intended to encompass); 47
U.S.C. § 1001 (8) (B) (i) (including "commercial mobile ser-
vice" providers); 47 U.S.C. § 153(27) (broadly defining "com-
mercial mobile service" to include personal communications
services and any other service employing "a regularly inter-
acting group of base, mobile, portable, and associated con-
trol and relay stations... for private one-way or two-way land
mobile radio communications").
63 See 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (8) (B) (ii). A more elaborate dis-
cussion appears in H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(1), at 20-21
(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3500-01.
64 See 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(C)(i); H.R. Rep. No. 103-
827(I), at 21 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3501 (in-
from a remote location without enabling access to
any communication not authorized for intercep-
tion. 65 Carriers do not have to maintain the same
capability for enabling access to private net-
works. 66 Carriers are not responsible for the
decryption of any communication that is en-
crypted using either an algorithm not provided by
the carrier or an algorithm that the carrier does
not have the ability to decrypt. 67 On the other
hand, a telecommunications carrier that is a com-
mercial mobile service provider must identify the
carrier providing mobile services to an adjacent
service area when the subject of a CALEA inter-
cept order leaves the original service area and is
"handed off' to the adjacent carrier. 68
All court-ordered law enforcement access to
communications and call-identifying information
must occur simultaneously with transmission un-
less law enforcement agrees to receive it at an-
other time.6 -' If access to call-identifying informa-
tion has been authorized under a pen register, or
trap-and-trace device order, no information re-
garding the physical location of the subscriber
may be provided to law enforcement other than
the telephone number.7 11 Finally, the telecommu-
nications carrier must protect "the privacy and se-
curity of communications and call-identifying in-
formation not authorized to be intercepted." - 7,
cluding electronic mail and other computer-based online ser-
vices as examples of "information services").
65 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a). The precise definition of "call-
identifying information" has been the subject of much con-
trove rsy.
66 See47 U.S.C. § 1002(b) (2) (B).
67 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b) (3). For example, a communi-
cation that has been digitally encoded by the carrier for
transmission must be converted back into a discernible ana-
log voice signal for interception, but the carrier does not
have to decode communication scrambled independently by
one of the parties to a conversation.
68 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(d). This situation most often oc-
curs in conversations on cellular or PCS telephones while
driving a car. When a phone-chatting driver leaves a mobile
carrier's service area, that carrier will no longer have access
to the driver's communication. CALEA requires that if the
communication is subject to an intercept order, the assisting
carrier must provide the identity of the new carrier whose
service area the driver has entered. See also H.R. Rep. No.
103-827(I), at 24 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3504.
69 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1), (2)(A).
70 See47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2).
71 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (4) (A). See also 47 U.S.C. § 1004
(Section 105 of CALEA). "[C]arriers must ensure that the
policies and procedures which they establish .. . (1) require
appropriate authorization to activate interception of commu-
nications or access to call-identifying information; and (2)
prevent any such interception or access without such authori-
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Although it may be difficult to imagine a law en-
forcement agency informing a court that viola-
tions of this last mandate have occurred, any sus-
tained failure to comply with CALEA could result
in civil penalties to the carrier of $10,000 per
day.7
2
B. Developing Technical Standards for
Implementation
Just as Congress charged the telecommunica-
tions industry with ensuring the privacy of its own
networks, it also delegated the initial determina-
tion of technical standards for compliance with
CALEA to industry participants. 73 In creating a
safe harbor provision that allowed carriers to com-
ply with the assistance capability requirements of
CALEA simply by meeting the accepted industry
standard, Congress hoped to encourage efficient
implementation of those requirements.7 4 Tele-
communications carriers and equipment manu-
facturers, under the auspices of the Telecommu-
nications Industry Association ("TIA"), thus
began to craft these technical standards in 1995.75
The development of the standards so far has been
concerned primarily with wireline, cellular and
zation." In Re Communications Assistance for Law Enforce-
ment Act, Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 4151, at para. 20
(1999) (setting forth minimum system security and integrity
requirements for compliance with Section 105 of CALEA)
[hereinafter First Report and Order].
72 The carrier must not only fail to comply with the re-
quirements of CALEA, but there must also be no other rea-
sonably available access to the communication (such as an-
other carrier). See 18 U.S.C. § 2522(a); 47 U.S.C.
§ 1007(a)(1). In addition, compliance must be reasonably
achievable using available technology. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 1007(a) (2). The court issuing the surveillance order must
then order the carrier to make the necessary modifications to
achieve compliance. See 18 U.S.C. § 2522(a). Fines may only
be imposed for violations of modification orders. The court
must consider good faith efforts by the carrier to comply and
any unreasonable effect that compliance may have on the
carrier's ability to do business. See 18 U.S.C. § 2522(c) (1); 47
U.S.C. § 1007(b).
73 See 47 U.S.C. § 1006(a) (2).
(a) Safe harbor . . . (2) Compliance under accepted
standards-A telecommunications carrier shall be found
to be in compliance with the assistance capability re-
quirements under [S]ection 1002 ... if the carrier... is
in compliance with publicly available technical require-
ments or standards adopted by an industry association or
standard-setting organization ... to meet the require-
ments of [S]ection 1002."
Id.
74 See,47 U.S.C. § 1006(a) (1)-(2). This safe harbor provi-
sion does not allow a carrier to avoid the requirements of 47
U.S.C. § 1002 in the absence of accepted technical standards.
broadband PCS carrier compliance. At first, sug-
gestions from law enforcement agencies were wel-
come.
7 6
In 1997, the TIA submitted its draft standard
for balloting with the American National Stan-
dards Institute ("ANSI")." 7 However, the draft
standard was voted down with unanimous opposi-
tion from law enforcement. 78 Attached to the
FBI's ballot was a list of eleven technical capabili-
ties not included in the industry's draft standard
that the FBI believed to be mandated by
CALEA.7 9 Later reduced to nine items, this list be-
came known as the FBI "punch list."80 After a few
revisions to the standard, none of which included
punch list items, the TIA decided to circumvent
ANSI and another law enforcement veto by rebal-
loting the revised draft standard under its own
procedures as an "interim standard."'8 1 Following
unanimous approval of the interim standard by
industry ballots, the TIA and Committee T182
jointly published interim standard J-STD-025,
Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance (the
'3-standard"). TIA and Committee TI then
adopted it as the accepted standard defining tech-
nical services, features and interfaces to satisfy the
See 47 U.S.C. § 1006(a) (3).
75 See In Re Communications Assistance for Law Enforce-
ment Act, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd. 3149, at
para. 44 (1997) [hereinafter CALEA NPRM]. See also USTA
Brief supra note 4.
76 See In Re Communications Assistance for Law Enforce-
ment Act, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd.
22632, at para. 11 (1998) [hereinafter FNPRM].
77 See id. at para. 12. Industry members, law enforcement
agencies and any other interested parties could participate in
balloting. See id. at n.28.
78 See id.
79 See id. at para. 12-13.
80 See id. at para. 13. The two items removed from the list
were "standardized delivery interface" and "separated deliv-
ery," limiting the number of delivery interfaces and requiring
separate delivery of information for each participant in a
conference call, respectively. Id. at para. 13 n.30. The Depart-
ment of Justice apparently conceded that neither of these
items was mandated by CALEA. See id. The nine remaining
items, further discussed below in this paper, are: 1) content
of subject-initiated conference calls; 2) party hold, join and
drop on conference calls; 3) subject-initiated dialing and sig-
naling; 4) in-band and out-of-band signaling; 5) timing infor-
mation; 6) surveillance status; 7) continuity check tone; 8)
feature status; and 9) dialed digit extraction.
81 According to ANSI procedures, an interim standard is
a "trial use" standard valid for only three years. See id. at para.
14.
82 Committee Ti is the wireline standards-setting body
sponsored by the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry
Solutions. See id. at para. 14 n.35, para. 15.
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safe harbor provisions of CALEA.83
Appreciating the likelihood of such a disagree-
ment occurring between law enforcement and the
telecommunications industry, Congress explicitly
provided for mediation in the form of an FCC rul-
ing upon the petition of "a Government agency or
any other person [who] believes that [the
adopted industry] standards are deficient."' 4
Among the petitions for rulemaking filed with the
Commission under Section 107(b) of the Act 5
was one filed jointly by the FBI and the Depart-
ment ofJustice ("DOJ"). 6 While the DOJIFBIPeti-
tion generally lamented the under-inclusiveness of
the J-standard, another petition for rulemaking
filed one day earlier by the Center for Democracy
and Technology ("CDT") maintained that the
standard was over-inclusive and that compliance
with it was not reasonably achievable.8 7 Closing
the triangle was a petition filed by the TIA, asking
the Commission to resolve the dispute over the J-
standard's completeness. TIA also asked the Com-
mission to establish a permanent standard on an
expedited basis and to "remand any further tech-
nical standardization work to TIA."8 8 The Com-
mission responded with a Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking ("FNPRM') under its rulemaking au-
thority granted by sections 107(b) and 301 (a) of
CALEA. 9 In its FNPRM, the Commission made
tentative conclusions regarding whether two con-
tested features of the J-standard and the nine
punch list items each satisfied the assistance capa-
bility requirements of the Act.90 It further stated
that the uncontested technical requirements of
the J-standard were "beyond the scope of this pro-
ceeding," and that any necessary modifications to
83 See id. at para. 15.
84 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b).
85 47 U.S.C. § 1006.
86 See DOJ/FBI Petition, supra note 30.
87 See FNPRM, 13 FCC Rcd. at para. 18-19.
88 Id. at para. 20.
89 See id. at para. 23. Sections 107(b) and 301 (a) are codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1006(b) and 229(a), respectively. The
former provision authorizes rulemaking specifically in re-
sponse to petitions for rulemaking filed under 47 U.S.C.
§ 1006(b). The latter authorizes the Commission to "pre-
scribe such rules as are necessary to implement the require-
ments of CALEA." 47 U.S.C. § 229(a).
90 See ENPRM, 13 FCC Rcd. at para. 24.
91 Id. at para. 45, 132-33.
92 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2).
93 Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 16794.
94 See id. at para. 1. The standards adopted in the Third
Report and Order only apply to wireline, cellular and PCS carri-
the J-standard made by the Commission should be
implemented by TIA.9 1 Finally, the FNPRM also
sought opinions regarding the proper interpreta-
tion of the phrase "reasonably available" as it per-
tained to call-identifying information delivered
under intercept authority authorized by Section
103.92
III. THIRD REPORT AND ORDER
At the end of August 1999, the Commission re-
leased its Third Report and OrdeP3 that set out tech-
nical standards for compliance with CALEA's as-
sistance capability requirements. 9 4 In addressing
the concerns of numerous groups regarding the
issues discussed in the FNPRM, the Third Report
and Order essentially adopted the J-standard plus
six of the nine punch list items requested by the
FBI.9 5 The Commission also therein defined "rea-
sonably available" to refer to call-identifying infor-
mation that is "present at an lAP and can be made
available without the carrier being unduly bur-
dened with network modifications."96
A. Location Information
One of the most hotly debated features of the J-
standard is its inclusion of location information
that, if available at a given LAP, can provide the
"mobile terminal" location being used by the sub-
ject of the intercept order.9 7 In this regard, the
Third Report and Order refers specifically to the stat-
utory definition of "call-identifying information,"
which includes information identifying the origin,
direction, destination or termination of a commu-
ers. See id.
95 See id.
96 Id. at para. 29. An "IAP"-intercept access point-is
defined in the J-standard as "a point within a telecommunica-
tion system where some of the communications or call-identi-
fying information of an intercept subject's equipment, facili-
ties and services are accessed." Id. at para. 14 (quotingJ-STD-
025 § 4.2.2). In other words, it is the physical point at which
the line is tapped, which is usually a switch. See id. at para. 28
n.65. The J-standard more narrowly defines "reasonably avail-
able" as "present at an intercept access point for call processing
purposes." Id. at para. 28 (emphasis added) (citing J-STD-025
§ 4.2.1.).
97 See id. at para. 37. The approval of this feature of the J-
standard is one of the primary issues presented by the USTA,
CTIA and CDT in their petition for review of the FCC's Third
Report and Order. At publication this appeal was pending in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit. See USTA Brief supra note 4.
[Vol. 8
CALEA Telecommunication Standards
nication.98 The Commission determined that the
Act mandates the inclusion of certain location in-
formation as call identifying because it includes
"origin" and "destination" in the statutory defini-
tion of call-identifying information. 99 The Com-
mission limited such location information to cell
site identification with regard to wireless commu-
nications, drawing an analogy to street address in-
formation already available to law enforcement
for wireline telephone numbers. 10 0 In response to
CALEA's provision limiting location information
acquired under pen register or trap-and-trace au-
thority to "what may be determined from the tele-
phone number,"10 1 the Commission adopted the
DOJ/FBI position that this provision does not en-
tirely preclude location information from being
"call-identifying information." Rather, the author-
ization requirements for law enforcement to gain
access to such information are much stricter than
those imposed on pen register and trap-and-trace
device authorization. 102
B. Packet-Mode Communication Contents
The second contested feature of the J-standard
is its failure to define a technical standard for sep-
arating the contents of packet-mode communica-
tions from the "call-identifying information" that
would theoretically be available to law enforce-
ment even under pen register authority. 10 3 Such
an omission could presumably make the entire
communication accessible to law enforcement re-
gardless of the level of authorized surveillance.1 0 4
98 See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 44
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (2)).
99 See id.
100 See id. at para. 44-45.
101 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2).
102 See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 44.
103 "Packet-mode" refers to "a communication where in-
dividual packets or virtual circuits of a communication within
a physical circuit are switched or routed by the accessing tele-
communication system. Each packet may take a different
route through the intervening network(s)." Id. at para. 47
n.97 (quoting J-STD-025 § 3.). Some examples of packet-
mode services are Integrated Services Digital Network
("ISDN"), Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA"), Time
Division Multiple Access ("TDMA"), Asynchronous Transfer
Mode ("ATM") and Internet Protocol ("IP") services. See id.
at para. 55 n.106. Traditional local wireline telephone ser-
vice, where the entire two-way communication passes
through the same path, is described as "circuit-mode." See id.
at para. 47 n.97.
The issue of separating packet-mode communication con-
tents from identifying information will continue to be de-
Recognizing the difficulty of defining any uni-
form assistance capability standard for the numer-
ous existing packet-mode technologies, particu-
larly given their rapidly evolving nature, the
Commission requested that TIA further study the
matter and report its findings by September 30,
2000.105 The Commission then adopted the ex-
isting J-standard as an interim standard, poten-
tially making available to law enforcement both
call contents and call-identifying information
under the authority required for a pen register by
September 30, 2001.106
C. FBI Punch List
The Commission's FNPRM tentatively ad-
dressed nine punch list items that the DOJ and
FBI believe are mandated by CALEA but were not
addressed in the J-standard.1° 7 In the Third Report
and Order, five of the punch list items were held to
be within the scope of CALEA's definition of "call-
identifying information" (at least under certain
circumstances) and thus included in the assis-
tance capability requirements of Section 103.108
These five items are (as further discussed below)
information regarding: 1) party hold, join and
drop on conference calls; 2) subject-initiated dial-
ing and signaling; 3) in-band and out-of-band sig-
naling; 4) call timing; and 5) dialed digit extrac-
tion (or "post-cut-through" digits). 10 9 Another of
the punch list items (contents of subject-initiated
conference calls) was defined as a communication
"to or from the equipment, facilities, or services of
bated as the capability to intercept digital communications is
contemplated by the new Ch. 9 in Tit. 47 of the United States
Code, "Interception of Digital and Other Communications."
Furthermore, there is a growing industry consensus that tele-
communications networks as a whole are moving toward
packet-based architecture. See id. at para. 51-53.
104 See id. at para. 53 (noting the complete lack of feasi-
bility of monitoring individual packet data streams).
105 See id. at para. 55-56.
106 See id. In supporting its ruling, the Commission as-
signed greater weight to the cost-minimization and innova-
tion-encouraging factors of 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b) (1)-(5) (list-
ing factors to be considered by the Commission when
exercising its rulemaking authority) than it did to the pri-
vacy-protection factor. The Commission noted "independent
legal barriers" that existed to using illegally obtained commu-
nications in court proceedings. See Third Report and Order, 14
FCC Rcd. at para. 56 (referring to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518.).
107 See FNPRM, 13 FCC Rcd. at para. 13, 32.
108 See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 74, 82,
89, 95, 119.
109 See id.
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a subscriber" and thus an authorized interception
under CALEA.1 10 By contrast, the Commission re-
jected requirements for continuity check tones
and the provision of surveillance and feature sta-
tus information, which were the remaining three
punch list items requested by the FBI. The Com-
mission rejected these requirements because it
held that they fell outside the Act's specific man-
date.'"
1. Content of Subject-Initiated Conference Calls
The Commission adopted a practical approach
to this FBI punch list item: it interpreted CALEA
to allow the authorized surveillance of all confer-
ence call contents reasonably available at the in-
tercept access point ("LAP") from which the sub-
ject is monitored. 12 Citing provisions of CALEA
Section 103 pertaining to "mobile service assis-
tance requirements," however, the Commission
concluded that a separate order would be re-
quired to enable law enforcement agencies to
gain full access to contents of subject-initiated
conference calls supported by the services of a re-
mote carrier. 1 The Third Report and Order does
not require carriers to provide law enforcement
with access to conference communications that
are not available on the carriers' own equip-
ment. 11 4 Nor is any carrier required to provide
law enforcement with access to conference call
conversations that continue after the subject has
terminated his or her connection-regardless of
the service supporting the communication. 1 5
110 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1). See Third Report and Order, 14
FCC Rcd. at para. 64, 66.
111 See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 101,
106, 111.
112 See id. at para. 66-67. So long as the conference call is
hosted by the telecommunications carrier to which the wire-
tap subject subscribes, law enforcement can monitor the con-
tents of conversations among other parties to the conference
call even if the wiretap subject puts the conference call on
hold. See id. at para. 66. Therefore, if the conference call is
hosted by another carrier's equipment, only those portions
of the call in which the subject is participating will be accessi-
ble at the LAP. This may become relevant if the subject does
not initiate the conference call or if the "conference bridge"
for a subject-initiated conference call is located remotely-as
is possible with some on-demand conference services. See id.
at para. 67. Here, the Commission's refusal to require that a
carrier's assistance continue after the communication has
been given to another carrier is consistent with its treatment
of wireless communications assistance when a wiretap subject
has left the carrier's service area. See discussion supra note 68.
11 See id. at para. 67 n.128 (citing 47 U.S.C.
2. Party Hold, Join and Drop On Conference Calls
This second punch list item refers to a network
signal generated by the equipment or service host-
ing a conference call. It effectively identifies indi-
vidual parties as each connects to and disconnects
from a conference call, or when one or more con-
ference call participants are put on hold.1 6 Al-
though such signals are not currently available
everywhere, the Commission determined that
they were "call-identifying information" within the
scope of Section 103 and thus required if the con-
ference call uses the carrier's facilities, equipment
or services. 11 The Commission held that "party
join" and "party drop" signals identified the origin
and termination of a communication, respec-
tively, bringing both signals within the scope of
CALEA section 102.111 On the other hand, the
Commission found that "party hold" signals were
information regarding the "temporary origin,
temporary termination, or re-direction of a com-
munication."" 19 The Commission determined that
access to "party hold" signals, as a group, was nec-
essary for law enforcement to monitor accurately
the contribution to a conference call made by the
subject of a wiretap order, as well as to minimize
interception of communications not involving the
subject. 120
3. Subject-Initiated Dialing and Signaling
When the subject of law enforcement surveil-
lance activates carrier-provided service features
§§ 1002(a)(1), (d)).
114 See id. at para. 67.
115 See id. at para. 67 n. 129.
116 See id. at para. 68.
117 See id. at para. 75. The Commission found that party
hold, join and drop signals were "reasonably available" within
the meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2). The Commission
thus required the hosting carrier to provide law enforcement
access to these signals, even in situations where these signals
are not currently generated. See id. Presumably, this access
includes services provided by a carrier's subcontractors. See
id. at para. 71 (recognizing that Bell Atlantic raised this is-
sue). However, no such network signals are required if the
conference services are provided by equipment located on a
customer's premises because no signals are generated by the
carrier's network itself. See id. at para. 75.
118 Seeid. atpara. 74. See also4 7 U.S.C. § 1001(2) (includ-
ing in the definition of "call-identifying information" signals
that identify "the origin ... or termination" of a communica-
tion).
119 Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 74.
120 See id.
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such as call hold, call transfer, call forwarding, call
waiting, or adding and dropping parties to a con-
ference call, the Commission has held that notifi-
cation of such activation is "call-identifying infor-
mation" mandated by the assistance capability
requirements of CALEA. 21 These signals can be
distinguished from party hold, join and drop sig-
nals because they only cover functions initiated by
a surveillance subject and include services used in
conjunction with nonconference calls.1 22 Like
party hold, join and drop signals, these signals
were held by the Commission to identify the ori-
gin, direction, destination or termination of a call.
The Commission, therefore, requires that carriers
provide law enforcement with access to these sig-
nals because they are necessary for law enforce-
ment to associate other call-identifying informa-
tion with the correct communication.1 23 However,
subject-initiated dialing and signaling is not "read-
ily available" to a carrier if processed by equip-
ment located on a customer's premises, which
means that the production of such privately gen-
erated information cannot be compelled. 124
4. In-Band and Out-of-Band Signaling
The Commission found some in-band and out-
of-band signaling to be included in the CALEA
definition of "call-identifying information." 1 25
Therefore, to the extent that such signals sent by
the carrier's equipment or services to the sub-
scriber-such as call waiting notification, new
121 See id. at para. 82. The Commission found that sub-
ject-initiated dialing and signaling, including dialed digits,
depressed or released on-hook buttons and use of flash but-
tons, were "reasonably available" to the extent that these sig-
nals were processed at the IAP. See id.
122 See id. at para. 81. Party hold, join and drop signals
(as referenced in the second punch list item) contain infor-
mation relating to all parties to a conference call-not just
the subject of a wiretap order. Subject-initiated dialing and
signaling, while containing some overlapping information,
focuses instead on all signals generated only by the subject of
a wiretap order, whether or not he or she is in a conference
call. See id. (discussing the DOJ/FBI reply comments to Bell-
South's suggestion that information from such signals would
be redundant).
123 See id. at 82 (referring to 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001 (2) (defin-
ing "call-identifying information") and 1002(a) (2) (B) (iden-
tifying capability requirement for associating call-identifying
information with call content)). An example presented in
the Third Report and Order features a hypothetical law enforce-
ment officer becoming confused as to which communication
matches which call-identification information when a subject
activates his or her call waiting in order to answer another
call. See id.
voice mail notification, busy signal and ringing
tone-pass through the LAP, they are "readily
available" and thus required for law enforcement
access under CALEA Section 103.126 As with party
hold, join and drop, and subject-initiated dialing
and signaling, any signal generated on-premises
by customer equipment is not "reasonably availa-
ble" and thus is not a required law enforcement
assistance capability.1 27
5. Timing Information
The Third Report and Order imposes a require-
ment on telecommunications carriers for time
stamps on all transmissions to law enforcement
agencies delivered pursuant to an interception or-
der.' 2 The, Commission considered the time
stamp itself to be "call-identifying information"
within the meaning of both sections 102 and 103
of CALEA. 129 Furthermore, the Commission es-
tablished a maximum delivery time of eight
seconds for call-identifying information, begin-
ning when the information is received at the
IAP. 130
6. Surveillance Status
Periodic surveillance status information, which
would theoretically include updated wiretap activ-
ity and functionality data, was held by the Com-
mission to be outside of the scope of necessary as-
sistance capability requirements under CALEA.1 31
124 See discussion supra note 117. See also Third Report and
Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 82.
125 See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 89.
The Commission supported this finding by noting that such
signaling indicates "information about the termination of a
call." Id.
126 See id. Although most of the examples given in the
Third Report and Order are signals that would be audible to the
subject, in-band and out-of-band signaling also includes
nonaudible signals, such as remotely activated telephone
message lights or text messages. See id. at para. 83. Signals
that do not result in a message to the subscriber are not "call-
identifying information." See id.
127 See id.
128 See id. at para. 95.
129 See id. (bringing a time stamp within range of the Sec-
tion 102 definition of "call-identifying information" and not-
ing its necessity in associating the call-identifying information
with the underlying communication).
130 See id. at para. 96. Transmission to law enforcement
must occur "within eight seconds 95% of the time." Id.
131 See id. at paras. 97, 101. Paragraph 97 of the Third
Report and Order describes functions requested under the
heading of "surveillance status" as including "the date, time
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Apart from the fact that carriers do not currently
generate this information, and it is entirely sepa-
rate from any existing communications or signals
that could be intercepted legally, the Commission
concluded that surveillance status information
was not itself "call-identifying information.' ' 132
7. Continuity Check Tone
A continuity check tone, as requested by the
FBI, consists of a dial tone transmitted over a call
content channel to a law enforcement agency
whenever the wiretap subject's telecommunica-
tions medium (subject to the intercept order) is
not in use. 3 3 The Commission attempted to dis-
tinguish this tone from surveillance status infor-
mation on the basis that a continuity check tone
effectively only notifies carriers and law enforce-
ment agencies when an active call occurs. How-
ever, it used essentially the same reasoning to ex-
clude both features from the assistance capability
mandates of CALEA.13
8. Feature Status
Feature status was the third punch list feature
held to be outside the scope of CALEA's assis-
tance capability mandates.1 35 The Commission de-
fined feature status information as notification of
certain modifications to the wiretap subject's call-
ing service subscriptions.1 3 6 Although it noted
that such information can be obtained from ex-
isting records by sending a subpoena to a carrier,
the Commission determined that feature status
messages were neither "call-identifying informa-
tion" nor communications, and thus excluded
these messages from the requirements of CALEA
Section 103.137
and location of the wiretap; identification of the subscriber
whose facilities are under surveillance; and identification of
all voice channels that are connected to the subscriber." Id. at
para. 97.
132 See id. at para. 101.
133 See id. at para. 102.
134 See id. at paras. 102 n.197, 106 (contrasting the con-
tinuity check tone from surveillance status information and
defining the relevant scope of the latter as whether the wire-
tap is operational).
135 See id. at para. 111.
136 See id. at para. 107. Examples include the addition or
deletion of such service capabilities as call waiting and con-
ference calling, as well as a change of telephone number or
disconnection of service. See id.
137 See id. at para. 111.
9. Dialed Digit Extraction
The Commission wrestled with the versatile util-
ity of digits dialed after an initial call connection
(often referred to as "post-cut-through digits"1 38)
in the Third Report and Order in an attempt to de-
lineate the characteristics of digits comprising call
content and those which merely route the call to
its destination. 39 At odds were the necessity of ac-
cess to digits dialed after the initial connection to
a long-distance carrier using a toll free access
number, and the privacy interest in digits dialed
for purposes of conducting a telephone banking
transaction or using a credit card to order mer-
chandise. 140 The privacy issue was treated in the
Third Report and Order as subordinate to the cost of
developing technology capable of distinguishing
the two types of post-cut-through digits. Thus, the
Commission responded in a manner consistent
with its disposition toward packet-mode commu-
nications and found that delivery of all post-cut-
through digits is an assistance capability require-
ment of CALEA Section 103.141 The practical ef-
fect of this conclusion is that all post-cut-through
digits will be accessible to law enforcement agen-
cies conducting surveillance under the authority
of a pen register order. 142 As with packet-mode
communications, the Third Report and Order ap-
pears to leave the privacy of post-cut-through dig-
its (at least temporarily) in the hands of inter-
cepting law enforcement agencies restrained only
by a minimization requirement and the exclusion-
ary rule. 143
IV. ANALYSIS
The Commission's Third Report and Order con-
veys an intention to preserve the status quo for
138 Id. at para. 112.
139 See id. at para. 119-123.
140 See id. at para. 119. The Commission held that post-
cut-through digits dialed for call-routing purposes were call-
identifying information. See id. Other post-cut-through digits,
such as credit card and bank account numbers, are consid-
ered call content and thus meriting additional constitutional
protection. See id. at para. 114 (discussing comments of EFF,
EPIC and ACLU). While the former is legally accessible
under pen register authority, the latter, if treated as call con-
tent, should not be accessible. See id.
141 See id. at para. 123.
142 See id.
143 See id. See also discussion supra notes 9-10 (introduc-
ing Weeks and the exclusionary rule).
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law enforcement while strictly construing the lan-
guage of CALEA so as to minimize its economic
impact on the telecommunications industry. In-
deed, the Third Report and Order leaves intact the J-
standard developed by industry participants. As-
suming that developers of the J-standard had their
own economic interests in mind, the cost to in-
dustry of implementing CALEA should be mini-
mized. Of course, this is not to say that the unsub-
sidized cost of CALEA implementation will be
small. 14
4
Moreover, the additional technical capability
requirements defined by the Third Report and Or-
der were selected carefully to conform to existing
J-standard features as closely as possible without
depriving law enforcement agencies of tradition-
ally available electronic surveillance capabili-
ties. 145 This view of the Commission's action com-
pels the conclusion that it satisfied two of the
three major policies behind CALEA. Those poli-
cies are: "(1) to preserve a narrowly focused capa-
bility for law enforcement agencies to carry out
properly authorized intercepts; (2) to protect pri-
144 The high estimate of the total industry cost for imple-
mentation of the J-standard without any punch list features
exceeds $4 billion. See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at
para. 20 (referring to the Cellular Telecommunication In-
dustry Association's estimate). Aggregate revenue' estimates
by five major telecommunications equipment manufacturers,
on the other hand, total $916 million for the core J-standard
and an additional $414 million for all nine punch list items.
See id. at para. 30, app. B (breaking down manufacturers' cost
estimates by punch list item and distinguishing between wire-
line and wireless service equipment). Of the total cost, Con-
gress initially authorized $500 million for appropriation dur-
ing fiscal years 1995 through 1998 to compensate certain
qualifying carriers that comply with the assistance capability
requirements. See 47 U.S.C. § 1009 (1994). Only $60 million
was appropriated directly during that period. See Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). This appropriation amount was
primarily because of implementation delays. See 144 CONG.
REc. S12,852-02, S12,857 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement
of Sen. Leahy). Congress has directly appropriated an addi-
tional $15 million for fiscal year 2000. See Consolidated Ap-
propriations Act of 2000, Pub L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-4 (1999). There are essentially two ways that a carier
may qualify for compensation from the Attorney General 'for
the carrier's CALEA compliance costs. One way, to qualify is
by making necessary modifications "in connection with
equipment, facilities, and services installed or deployed on or
before January 1, 1995." 47 U.S.C. § 1008(a) (1994). The
other way to qualify for compensation (concerning modifica-
tions to "equipment, facilities, and services installed or
deployed after January 1, 1995") is for the carrier to: 1) peti-
tion the Commission for a determination of whether compli-
ance is "reasonably achievable" by the carrier, considering
"whether compliance would impose significant difficulty or
expense on the carrier or on the users of the carrier's sys-
vacy in the face of increasingly powerful and per-
sonally revealing technologies; and (3) to avoid
impeding the development of new communica-
tions services and technologies."1 46 It was the
Commission's supposed failure to refrain from ef-
fectively making "a broad range of private infor-
mation"'14 7 available to law enforcement surveil-
lance that inspired the arguments against CALEA
implementation made by industry and civil liber-
ties groups in their consolidated appeal of the
Third Report and Order.14 8
A. Petition for Review of the Third Report and
Order
Following the FCC's adoption of the Third Re-
port and Order in August 1999, two industry as-
sociations and three civil liberties groups filed pe-
titions for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit. 49 The Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") filed a peti-
tion for review in the Ninth Circuit that was subse-
quently transferred to the D.C. Circuit. 150 After
tems"; and then 2) apply to the Attorney General for com-
pensation, assuming a Commission determination that com-
pliance is not reasonably achievable. Id. at § 1008(b).
145 See, e.g., discussion supra notes 103-106, 138-143 (dis-
cussing interception of packet-mode communications and
post-cut-through digits). Rather than imposing prohibitive
costs on the industry by requiing development of new' sur-
veillance technology usable only by law enforcement or de-
priving law enforcement of all access to communications pre-
viously available for three decades, the Commission split the
difference and adopted the "readily available" technology.
Also note the Commission's readiness to define "reasonably
available" as available at the LAP. The inference here is that
the Commission has done everything in its power to accom-
modate industry demands for the least expensive CALEA im-
plementation possible.
146 H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(I), at 13 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3493.
147 USTA Brief, supra note 4, at 11.
148 See id. at 2 (noting that two of three issues presented
for review focus on propriety of ordering overinclusive tech-
nical standards-that is, providing more information than
previously available under wiretap authority); Brief of Peti-
tioners Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC"), Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") and the American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU") at 1, United States Telecom Ass'n
v. FCC, (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Nos. 99-1442, 99-1466, 99-1475, 99-
1,523) (noting that three issues presented for review question
FCC propriety of ordering overinclusive standards and the
fourth questions whether the order directly violates the
Fourth Amendment) [hereinafter EPIC Brief].
149 The industry groups are the USTA and CTIA. The
civil liberties groups are EPIC, ACLU and CDT. See USTA
Brief supra note 4, at 2; EPIC Brief supra note 148.
150 See EPIC Brief supra note 148.
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consolidating these initial petitions, three more
industry groups and three telecommunications
companies intervened in the action. 15'
The main concern of the petitioners' briefs is
privacy protection. However, each argument turns
on whether the Commission overstepped its au-
thority, or acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner when it promulgated technical standards
for CALEA implementation in the Third Report
and Order.' 52 The first assistance capability hold-
ing challenged by petitioners is the Third Report
and Order's conclusion that cell location at the be-
ginning and end of a wireless telephone call is
"call-idenifying information" and therefore must
be made available to law enforcement. 153 The pe-
titioners put great emphasis on the danger that
disclosing such information poses to individual
privacy, characterizing the potential use of such
information as physical location tracking. 154 De-
spite a plausible construction of the statutory defi-
nition of "call-identifying information," however,
the petitioners fail to address the Commission's
argument that this capability preserves the elec-
tronic surveillance status quo. 155 Because law en-
forcement generally has access to the location as-
sociated with a wireline telephone number, the
Commission reasoned that providing the cell site
location for mobile communication interception
neither expands nor contracts existing electronic
surveillance authority. 156
Congress apparently envisioned this potential
gray area when it added a provision to CALEA
151 The intervening industry groups are the Personal
Communications Industry Association ("PCIA"), the Rural
Cellular Association ("RCA") and the Telecommunications
Industry Association ("TIA"). Companies intervening as of
Jan. 20, 2000 (the filing date of the petitioners' briefs) are
AirTouch Communications, Inc., Sprint Spectrum, L.P. and
U.S. West, Inc. See id. at iv. Note that many of the intervenors
are concerned specifically with mobile telecommunications
services.
152 See id. at 2; USTA Brief supra note 4, at 11. Privacy
protection concerns, as referenced in the accompanying text,
include both Title Ill and Fourth Amendment violations.
Many of the arguments made in both briefs use privacy con-
cerns as bases for concluding that the Commission exceeded
its authority under CALEA.
153 See USTA Brief supra note 4, at 18; EPIC Brief, supra
note 148, at 16.
154 See USIA Brief supra note 4, at 21 (referring to cell
location information as enabling "law enforcement officials
to monitor a person's location in near real-time"). Yet the
Commission explicitly stated that it would require no such
capability. See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 46.
155 See USTA Brief, supra note 4, at 19-20 (construing the
definition of "call-identifying information" in 47 U.S.C.
that denies law enforcement access to physical lo-
cation information using trap-and-trace device au-
thority. 157 Yet allowing suspects to prevent effec-
tive disclosure of their locations merely by using
mobile rather than wireline telephones cannot be
what Congress intended when it sought to pre-
serve law enforcement's existing electronic sur-
veillance capabilities. -58 The Commission strad-
dled the fence as best it could on this issue. First,
it required that mobile telecommunications carri-
ers develop the ability to provide cell site location.
Second, the Commission held that such informa-
tion could not be accessed by law enforcement
under trap-and-trace device authority alone.1 5 9 In
its role as "a forum . . . in the event a dispute
arises over the technical requirements,"1 60 the
Commission balanced three congressional pur-
poses for enacting CALEA. Privacy protection,
surveillance capability preservation and minimiza-
tion of any hindrance to technological innovation
received equal consideration. Despite petitioners'
arguments to the contrary, a different interpreta-
tion of "call-identifying information" with respect
to cell site location would have compromised one
or more of the driving forces behind CALEA's en-
actment and would have taken the Commission
beyond its authority as created under the Act.1 6
1
In addition to physical location information,
the petitioners also challenge the four punch list
features dealing with post-connection dialing and
signaling that the Commission adopted in the
Third Report and Order.162 The petitioners' chief
§ 1001 (2) as limited to telephone numbers only).
156 See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 45.
Law enforcement agencies have previously had access to the
location of a wireline telephone either from their own 911
databases or from a telephone carrier's records. See id.
157 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2).
158 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(l), at 13 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3493 (stating an intention to preserve a
"capability for law enforcement agencies to carry out prop-
erly authorized intercepts").
159 See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 44.
Most mobile carriers apparently contemplated providing
such information, as this capability is included in the J-stan-
dard. See id. at para. 45.
160 H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(I), at 27 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3507.
. '(', See USTA Brief supra note 4, at 11. Petitioners argue
that the Third Report and Order conflicts with the purpose of
CALEA in this regard and offer little reasoning to support
their conclusions. See id.
162 See id. at 22-27. These four contested punch list fea-
tures are: dialed digit extraction; party hold, join and drop-
on conference calls; subject-initiated dialing and signaling;
and in-band and out-of-band signaling. See id.
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concern is that some of this information can be
considered call content and thus could be subject
to Fourth Amendment privacy protections.1 6 3
This concern really applies only to dialed digit ex-
traction. In fact, the petitioners' only appropriate
argument against mandating law enforcement ac-
cess to the other contested punch list features
seems to be that these features should not be con-
sidered "call-identifying information" within the
meaning of CALEA.164
It is unclear why this should be the case, not-
withstanding the petitioners' careful construction
of the Act's statutory language and legislative his-
tory in their briefs. Petitioners offer no compel-
ling policy reason to support their implication
that, in an age of versatile telecommunications
services, law enforcement agencies acting under
proper court-ordered wiretap authorization
should not receive information necessary to
match call-identifying information with call con-
tent.165 Even if the four challenged punch list
items are not construed as call-identifying fea-
tures, they would allow law enforcement agencies
acting under pen register or trap-and-trace device
authority to make sense of the telephone number
information received during electronic surveil-
lance. Suppose, for example, that an intercept
subject hosts a conference call with multiple par-
ticipants. At best, a pen register would capture
only those digits dialed by the subject who set up
the conference call. Meanwhile, a trap-and-trace
device might capture the phone numbers of other
parties joining the call or, at least, the phone
number of the facility hosting the conference call.
Without additional information provided by tele-
communications carriers to law enforcement
agencies, these numbers captured by electronic
surveillance would be difficult or impossible to
understand. 166
Compare this example to what was once the
163 See EPIC Brief supra note 148, at 11-12.
164 See USTA Brief, supra note 4, at 24-27.
165 CALEA, in fact, requires that authorized access to
call-identifying information should be provided by telecom-
munications carriers to law enforcement agencies "in a man-
ner that allows it to be associated with the communication to
which it pertains." 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2) (B).
166 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(1), at 12-13 (1994), re-
printed in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3492-93. The House Report ac-
companying CALEA specifically mentioned call forwarding, a
service feature included in the "subject-initiated dialing and
signaling information" punch list item, as an impediment to
authorized wiretaps. Id.
only possible situation facing law enforcement in
electronic surveillance. One single telephone di-
aled a connection request to another single tele-
phone, and the only numbers with any signifi-
cance to the call were those dialed prior to
connection. 167 Law enforcement agencies gath-
ered this information using pen registers or trap-
and-trace devices for the express purpose of iden-
tifying "the associates and confederates of those
believed to be conducting the illegal opera-
tion."'6 That identification often is no longer
possible without the additional information con-
tained in party hold,join and drop signals on con-
ference calls; subject-initiated dialing and signal-
ing; and in-band and out-of-band signaling. Thus
the Commission had no real choice but to include
this information within the scope of "call-identify-
ing information" under CALEA. Otherwise, the
Commission would have failed to preserve the sta-
tus quo of electronic surveillance capability for
law enforcement agencies acting under pen regis-
ter or trap-and-trace device authority.16'7
The petitioners make a stronger case against
the adoption of dialed digit extraction as a techni-
cal requirement in the Third Report and Order.
While the other three punch list items contested
by the petitioners cover information regarding
changes in the status of an intercept subject's
communication or changes in the identities of
other parties to the call, dialed digit extraction in-
cludes all numbers dialed after the initial call has
been connected. 170 The petitioners argue that re-
quiring carriers to provide this information runs
afoul of both the Fourth Amendment and Title
III because the numbers dialed are often credit
card numbers, bank account numbers or pass-
words, all of which are properly considered call
content. 1 7 1 They suggest that as "call-identifying
information" pursuant to the Third Report and Or-
der, these numbers would have to be made availa-
167 See id. at 13 ("[U]ntil recently, the question of system
design was never an issue for authorized surveillance").
168 New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 162.
169 See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at paras. 74,
82, 89 (finding party hold,join and drop on conference calls;
subject-initiated dialing and signaling information; and in-
band and out-of-band signaling to be call-identifying infor-
mation). These paragraphs also hold that the first two of the
three items listed here are necessary for law enforcement
agencies conducting electronic surveillance to know who is
talking to whom. See id.
170 See USTA Brief supra note 4, at 22.
171 See id.
2001
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
ble to law enforcement officers acting only under
the authority of a pen register order.17 2
Digits dialed after the initial connection is
made also include calls placed using a long-dis-
tance carrier that offers services accessible by a
toll free number.17 3 The Commission found these
numbers to be "call-identifying information."174
The problem lies in the local carrier's inability to
distinguish telephone numbers from bank ac-
count numbers once the initial connection has
been made. 175 The local carrier's expense of ex-
tracting post-cut-through digits is high enough
without requiring detection and separation of two
kinds of numbers before delivering them to law
enforcement. 76 Other alternatives considered by
the Commission were either even more invasive of
privacy than dialed digit extraction, or considered
too time consuming or inefficient to be feasi-
ble. 177 All things considered, the Commission de-
termined that all interests would be served best by
including dialed digit extraction in the technical
capabilities required by CALEA.17 1 In light of the
unfeasibility of the alternatives, this became an all-
or-nothing standard. To exclude the dialed digit
extraction capability entirely would contravene
the primary mandate of CALEA, which is to pre-
serve law enforcement's ability to carry out prop-
erly authorized electronic surveillance in the face
of rapidly changing telecommunications technol-
ogy. Adopting this dialed digit extraction stan-
dard maintains familiar application of the minimi-
zation requirement to law enforcement wiretap
applications, leaving individual privacy no worse
off in the context of a legal wiretap than it has
been since 1968.' 7 9
With respect to packet-mode communications,
172 See id.
173 See id.
174 See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 119.
175 See USTA Brief supra note 4, at 23.
176 The Commission noted that digit extraction alone
would be more expensive than any other punch list item. See
Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 123.
177 One alternative consisted of law enforcement ob-
taining full wiretap authority in order to access all post-con-
nection communications. Such authority is, of course, more
difficult to obtain than that required for a pen register, effec-
tively raising the standard of proof required for a pen regis-
ter order. Another alternative contemplated directing a pen
register order to each carrier with facilities used in a given
communication by the intercept subject. Even if it was feasi-
ble, this alternative would likely result in numerous lengthy
delays as law enforcement established multiple pen registers
at multiple carriers that could easily change from call to call.
both the petitioners' arguments and the Commis-
sion's conclusions are analogous to those made
regarding dialed digit extraction. It is another all-
or-nothing situation where excluding the capabil-
ity would be entirely against the driving purpose
of CALEA but requiring distillation of specific in-
formation contained within packets would be pro-
hibitively expensive-not to mention a potentially
severe impediment to future industry innovation.
Yet packet-mode communications rapidly are be-
coming ubiquitous telecommunications technol-
ogy to be exempted from wiretapping beyond the
short term.18 0 As with dialed digit extraction, the
petitioners argue that the Third Report and Order
gives law enforcement agencies more information
about surveillance subjects than they are author-
ized to receive-that is, law enforcement receives
information about call content under CALEA but
needs only to obtain a warrant for "call-identifying
information."' 8 1 One difference from dialed digit
extraction is that with packet-mode wiretaps, law
enforcement officers likely will have complete ac-
cess to voice communications and not just credit
card or bank account numbers.'8 2 A more signifi-
cant difference (as the technology currently ex-
ists) is that, unlike post-cut-through digits in cir-
cuit-mode communications, packet-mode call
content is essentially inseparable from "call-identi-
fying information. '" 183
Because packet-mode communications by de-
sign make more efficient use of telecommunica-
tions networks than circuit-mode communica-
tions, any government-imposed redesign of the
technology to facilitate separation of call-identify-
ing information from content would violate
CALEA's policy against impeding new technologi-
See id. at para. 120-22.
178 See id. at para. 123.
179 See discussion supra note 37-38(discussing the mini-
mization requirement of Title III).
180 See EPIC Brief supra note 148, at 4 (referring to
packet-mode networks as an important part of "next-genera-
tion telecommunications systems" and a soon-to-be "domi-
nant feature of our telecommunications landscape").
181 See USTA Brief supra note 4, at 32.
182 See id. at 35 (stating that the Third Report and Order
"permits law enforcement officials to intercept the contents of
packet communications with nothing more than a pen regis-
ter authorization"). See also Third Report and Order, 14 FCC
Rcd. at para. 56.
183 See, e.g., Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para.
53 (noting the utter lack of feasibility of separating call con-
tent contained in individual packets from the accompanying
call-identifying information).
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cal development. 184 The Commission readily ad-
mitted that it did not have enough information to
make a final determination regarding technical
standards for packet-mode surveillance assistance
capabilities. 1 5 For this reason, and in recognition
of the increasing importance of packet-mode
technologies, the Third Report and Order only es-
tablished an interim requirement that carriers de-
velop the ability to provide packet-mode commu-
nications in their entirety to properly authorized
law enforcement agencies.18 6 It is expected that a
permanent solution may be developed by the tele-
communications industry (with the TIA leading
the charge) as early as September 2000.18 7 Peti-
tioners should also take comfort in the Commis-
sion's footnote to the Third Report and Order that
points out that many carriers have the ability to
produce records containing only call-identifying
information. Such capability would thus afford
carriers the option of avoiding Fourth Amend-
ment concerns entirely when confronted with a
pen register order. 188 Still, given the sheer num-
ber and variety of services already incorporating
packet-mode technologies, in addition to the like-
lihood that they will continue to evolve and prolif-
erate, privacy issues surrounding the interception
of such communications are unlikely to disappear
soon.189
B. Why the Technical Standards of the Third
Report and Order Should Stand
In the end, determining technical standards for
CALEA implementation is fundamentally a matter
of administrative policy rather than law and there-
fore appropriately within the province of the FCC.
The petitioners' claims of privacy concerns and
184 See id. at para. 55 (pointing out this potential dan-
ger).
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 See id. at para. 56.
188 See USTA Brief, supra note 4, at 34; EPIC Brief supra
note 148, at 9. Cf. Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para.
55 n.107. To the contrary, the USTA and EPIC Briefs miscon-
strue this statement by the Commission as "ignor[ing]" and
"opt[ing] not to pursue this administratively and constitu-
tionally sound alternative."
189 See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 51
(adopting AT&T's comment that different packet-mode tech-
nologies may require different assistance capability stan-
dards).
190 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(I), at 13 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3493. Initially, Title III imposed no spe-
complaints about FCC mandates that violate Title
III and the Fourth Amendment are interlaced
with pretext and clearly misplaced. Title III di-
rectly regulates electronic surveillance conducted
by law enforcement, and not the activities of tele-
communications carriers or the FCC.' 90 Further-
more, the Fourth Amendment creates individual
rights against certain government searches and
seizures but does not grant telecommunications
carriers any rights to avoid FCC regulations. 9 1
The Third Report and Order, in contrast, purports
to govern neither the duties of law enforcement
nor the enforcement authority of courts. 192 It was
intended, pursuant to Congress' statutory com-
mand in CALEA, to update in technological terms
a carrier's legal duties under Title III, itself a long-
time guide for courts applying Fourth Amend-
ment warrant requirements to wiretaps. 19 3 Exactly
how this update, in an age of widespread techno-
logical change, could actually "mandat[e] uncon-
stitutional searches and seizures"' 94 or violate
both Title III and the Fourth Amendment is un-
clear.' 95 The Third Report and Order merely advo-
cates the most efficient and effective application
of CALEA's solutions to recent law enforcement
problems, while the petitioners' proposals would
allow federal wiretap law to be swept away on the
current of market innovation and thus render
CALEA toothless.
The Commission's role under CALEA is to es-
tablish technical standards upon petition by a gov-
ernment agency or any other person who believes
that any existing industry standards are defi-
cient. 19 6 Those technical standards, whether es-
tablished by the Commission or within the tele-
communications industry, constitute a safe harbor
for compliance with the assistance capability re-
cific responsibility on telecommunications carriers or anyone
else to assist law enforcement officials in effectuating wire-
taps. Indeed, that was the primary impetus behind CALEA.
191 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (beginning with an identi-
fication of"[t]he right of the people to be secure" as the pri-
mary focus of the amendment).
192 See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. I
(stating that it is directed solely at "wireline, cellular, and
broadband [PCS] carriers").
193 See discussion supra note 32(discussing the purposes
of the 1968 Act).
194 EPIC Brief supra note 148, at 17.
195 See USTA Brief, supra note 4, at 37 (characterizing the
Third Report and Order as expanding "law enforcement's abil-
ity to obtain content information" and contravening both the
Fourth Amendment and Title III).
196 See 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b).
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quirements of the Act. 197 As a safe harbor, compli-
ance with those standards is not compulsory but
merely suggested as a means of obtaining volun-
tary industry compliance with CALEA. 198 For
these reasons, the Third Report and Order does not
actually mandate or require compliance with any
of the technical standards defined therein. Even if
it did somehow carry the weight of a legal man-
date, such technological guidelines cannot dictate
the level of proof binding on courts when con-
fronted with an application by law enforcement
for a wiretap order. The legal determination of
the level of proof can only be made by courts
themselves, acting pursuant to Title III, the fed-
eral pen register statute or the Fourth Amend-
ment.199 In the event that the order sought does
not exactly fit within the contemplated scope of
these laws, Title III and Fourth Amendment case
law provide factual scenarios to guide courts in
determining the appropriate level of proof.2 °
Therefore, regardless of its language, the Third Re-
port and Order has no actual authority to define the
specific levels of proof necessary for certain types
of surveillance.
Because the Commission neither intends to,
nor actually does, redefine types of surveillance
that may occur under existing legal authority, the
petitioners' arguments that the Commission ex-
ceeded CALEA, and violated Title III and the
Fourth Amendment are based on a false premise.
With the exception of the civil liberties groups
that joined the appeal, the petitioners' privacy ar-
guments largely seem to be pretext for economic
concerns about the costs of meeting technical
standards in the Third Report and Order.2°1 Not
197 See 47 U.S.C. § 1006(a) (2).
198 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827(1), at 26 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3506. The report of the House Judiciary
Committee stated it best: "[c]ompliance with the industry
standards is voluntary, not compulsory. Carriers can adopt
other solutions for complying with the capability require-
ments." See id.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Escobar-de Jesus, 187 F.3d
148, 171 (1st Cir. 1999).
To the extent that Title III is designed to protect privacy
interests similar to those reflected in the Fourth Amend-
mnent... that statutory purpose was served by the district
court's finding of probable cause to intercept and by the
order's inclusion of other items of particularity, includ-
ing the identity of the person whose commtnications
were to be intercepted, the nature and location of the
telephone line to be intercepted, a particular descrip-
tion of the type of communication sought to be inter-
cepted, and a statement of the particular offense to
which the communications relate.
only could compliance raise industry costs
enough to affect subscription rates, but a wide-
spread public perception that the new technical
standards inherently lessen the privacy and secur-
ity of telecommunications networks could con-
ceivably cause subscribers to lose confidence in
newer services and technologies. Any resulting
loss of subscribers could then theoretically reduce
the expected return on telecommunications carri-
ers' investment in developing new services and
technologies and thus have the potential effect of
chilling technological innovation. 20 2 Yet one way
or another, whether through higher taxes or in-
creased telecommunications service rates, sub-
scribers will end up paying for CALEA. Industry
investments made today ultimately will cost less
than future, forced upgrades and penalties im-
posed by regulatory or judicial action to ensure
belated industry compliance with the Act. Other-
wise, the fact that new technologies so challenged
the traditional functionality of authorized wire-
taps as to prompt CALEA's enactment should re-
assure the true privacy advocates, because there
remain a number of available technologies unaf-
fected by the Act.20 3
Regardless of the petitioners' motivations to
challenge CALEA and the Commission's imple-
mentation duties under the Act, the courts will
eventually have to address legal questions
prompted by the development of new wiretap
technologies. Only then should Title III and
Fourth Amendment concerns come into play. For
example, the Commission clearly foresaw the pos-
sibility that law enforcement will seek only pen
register or trap-and-trace authority to intercept
Id.
200) See, e.g., id.
201 See discussion supra note 144 (discussing various esti-
mates of the cost of implementation).
202 See America Rides the Wireless Wave, THE ECONOMIST,
Apr. 29, 2000, at 57
This is pure speculation. As a whole, the general public
appears to be oblivious to telephone privacy issues and
to have gained rather than lost confidence in wireless
services. A graph appearing in a recent issue of THE
ECONOMIST shows mobile phone ownership penetration
of all United States households in 1999 at over 30%. The
level exceeded sixty percent in some urban areas.
id.
20- : Two major examples of exempt technologies and ser-
vices are encrypted or scrambled telecommunications, and
any communication classified as "information services," such
as electronic mail or paging services. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 1002(b)(2)-(3); 47 U.S.C. § 1001(6) (defining "informa-
tion services" for purposes of CALEA).
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packet-mode communications.20 4 However, there
is no legal authority for such an order. Under the
pen register statute, a court may issue an order
"authorizing the installation and use of a pen reg-
ister or a [trap-and-trace] device." 205 A pen regis-
ter is defined later in the statute as a device at-
tached to a telephone line that identifies the
telephone numbers dialed.20 6 Furthermore, a
trap-and-trace device is defined as identifying the
originating telephone number of an incoming
call.20 7 With the governing statute expressly lim-
ited in scope to capturing telephone numbers,
courts cannot issue pen register warrants authoriz-
ing the interception of packet-mode communica-
tions . 2 0 Thus the practical solution to this new
problem is properly left either for the judicial sys-
tem or Congress to remedy at a future date. The
FCC has fulfilled its statutory duty and only a
change in the statute or in Fourth Amendment
doctrine will drastically alter the Third Report and
Order now.
Just as technological advances prompted
CALEA's enactment, so too will they require con-
tinually updated technical standards for compli-
ance with the Act's assistance capability require-
ments that are designed to conform to the
inherent limitations of the regulated technolo-
gies. CALEA does indeed regulate technology by
requiring that certain capabilities be built into law
enforcement assistance capabilities. In doing so,
however, the statute does not attempt to limit the
state of the art but aims merely to keep up with it.
It is certainly not desirable in a free market society
for the future of technological innovation to be
determined by legally mandated design features,
but neither should the effective operation of the
law in a nation built on laws be threatened by fu-
ture technological change.20 9 Instead, there must
be compromises enabling technology and the law
to evolve together. Thus Congress conceived the
underlying design of CALEA-to provide advance
204 See Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at para. 56.
205 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a).
206 See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).
207 See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4).
208 See discussion supra Part III.C (discussing the Third
Report and Order's treatment of the FBI Punch List items). De-
spite any implications of the Third Report and Order to the con-
trary, there is no provision in CALEA that equates "call-iden-
tifying information" with information accessible pursuant to
a pen register order. Given the Commission's inclusion of
such punch list items as party hold, join and drop on confer-
ence calls, and in-band and out-of-band signaling within the
notice to the telecommunications industry of the
types of law enforcement assistance functionality
that it will be required to build into its new service
offerings to the public.
There are effectively three parties upon whom
the assistance capability provisions of CALEA im-
pose duties: the telecommunications industry, law
enforcement agencies and the FCC. The industry
had the initial responsibility for developing tech-
nical standards that met the Act's statutory re-
quirements. Law enforcement agencies were
handed the task of identifying problems, both
with existing technology and the technical stan-
dards proposed by industry for CALEA compli-
ance. Finally, in the event of a dispute over imple-
mentation between law enforcement agencies and
the telecommunications industry, the FCC was
chosen as the referee. The telecommunications
industry understandably wanted to minimize the
cost of implementation and thus proposed stan-
dards that required as few changes as possible to
existing facilities. Law enforcement agencies, of
course, hoped to take advantage of the benefits of
technology, both to overcome technical surveil-
lance difficulties that they faced with newer tele-
communications services and to expand their
overall electronic surveillance capabilities. 210
Armed with telecommunications expertise but
having scant experience with the law governing
searches and seizures, the FCC was thrust into the
unfortunate position of balancing these often
competing interests as directed by the statute. At
the same time, it had to provide telecommunica-
tions industry participants clear notice of exactly
what would be required of them in terms specific
enough to ensure their compliance. This is pre-
cisely what the Commission did-as best it could
given the limitations of both the law and the ex-
isting technology-because Congress had decided
that "somebody" had to do it. If anything, more
deference should be given to the wiretap laws in
scope of "call-identifying information," it is evidently a much
broader concept than just the initial telephone number di-
aled. See id.
209 For an in-depth discussion of the operability of the
"law of cyberspace" as a teacher of narrow tailoring in regula-
tory design and other issues presented by the interplay be-
tween law and technology, see Lawrence Lessig, The Law of
the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REv. 501
(1999).
210 Thus the FBI must define standards in addition to
those minimally adopted by industry or risk having its wiretap
authority preempted by changes in technology.
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analyzing these issues than to technology in recog-
nition of the exponentially longer amount of time
that it has traditionally taken for the law to
change. Technology, by nature, has always had
the advantage in the arena of privacy creation-if
not by design then by virtue of its mystery. 211
The Third Report and Order should stand because
it does not directly violate any constitutional
rights. The report's five-year gestation period,
complete with ample industry participation,
should quash any notions that the Commission ac-
ted arbitrarily or capriciously. It implements a re-
markable (if imperfect) attempt at harmonizing
the accelerating evolution of law and technology
in the wiretap context. While it should be ex-
pected that, over time, certain standards will need
refinement, short-term competitive barriers to im-
plementation have dropped significantly. In a sin-
gle stroke, the FCC provided the telecommunica-
tions industry with the external impetus necessary
for CALEA implementation that was previously
lacking and trivialized the industry's earlier fears
that action not taken by the entire industry might
competitively disadvantage the individual actor.
Congress used the Commission's rulemaking au-
thority as a check to balance the competing inter-
ests of progress and public safety, each repre-
sented on behalf of the general public by the
telecommunications industry and law enforce-
ment. The Commission should not relinquish this
hard won anchor point for the implementation of
CALEA, lest the growing rift between telecommu-
nications technology and the law become impass-
able.
V. CONCLUSION
The technical standards contained in the FCC's
Third Report and Order, In Re the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA"),
begin to effectively implement the assistance capa-
bility requirements of the Act as envisioned by
Congress. The Commission's proper exercise of
its rulemaking authority under CALEA should
211 As noted above, CALEA would not have been neces-
sary were it not for the de facto privacy created by the in-
overcome the telecommunications industry's re-
luctance to comply with all law enforcement re-
quests for additional features in electronic surveil-
lance. This result was warranted by statutory
design without contravention of either Title III or
the Fourth Amendment, because the capability
standards constitute a safe harbor for compliance
with the Act and not a determination of the ap-
propriate level of proof required for authoriza-
tion of certain types of electronic surveillance. Al-
though the Third Report and Order highlights
questions for courts regarding such requirements
for the legal authorization of certain new types of
interceptions, the preservation of CALEA's integ-
rity demands that these issues must be viewed as a
result not of the Commission's rulemaking but of
the limitations inherent in some new telecommu-
nications technologies.
For all of the above reasons, the Third Report
and Order should be upheld. Collaterally, telecom-
munications carriers should embrace (sooner
rather than later) upgrades to their facilities that
bring them into compliance with CALEA's new
technical standards in order to avoid penalties
and the potentially high cost of independently
marketed upgrade packages. Congress, federal
law enforcement agencies and the FCC all have
responded to the lack of industry initiative that
compelled enactment of CALEA. The govern-
ment has now mandated the incorporation of spe-
cific capabilities for making effective, legal wire-
taps into the designs of current and future
telecommunications technology and services. In-
dustry participants should welcome this opportu-
nity to maintain proprietary control over both the
enabling and the limitation of wiretap capabilities
in their own facilities. From a forward-looking ec-
onomic perspective, such control appears prefera-
ble either to forcing telecommunications carriers
to pay for piecemeal upgrades in the event of fu-
ture wiretap orders or to having the government
dictate new detailed technical capability standards
every time telecommunications technology takes
another step forward.
creasingly numerous, complicated and cryptic electronic sig-
nals that now comprise telecommunications.
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